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“Solutions in Hieroglyphic”: Ralph
Waldo Emerson, “Picturesque
Language,” and the Ancient Near
East
Mathieu Duplay
1 A graduate of Harvard Divinity School and a former Unitarian minister, Ralph Waldo
Emerson was predisposed to view the ancient Near East primarily as a textual corpus,
which  he  identified,  for  better  or  for  worse,  with  the  Biblical  canon.  By  now,  the
argument is familiar to every reader of his essays. “Palestine is ever the more valuable
as a chapter in universal history,” he writes in “Swedenborg; or, the Mystic,” conflating
the Holy Land with the “Hebrew muse” (RWE, 1850, 683): to him, the Bible is not just a
key historical document, but a paradigm of all “history” in its dual sense of bygone
events and of their formal, written record. On the one hand, he implies, the past exists
only in so far as it is kept alive by subsequent acts of interpretation, like a book whose
truth lies in “transition” but which becomes “false if fixed,” Scripture being a case in
point  (682).  On  the  other  hand,  the  possibility  of  such  acts  is  guaranteed  by  the
existence of  reliable modes of  decipherment,  guided by the “intuition of  the moral
sentiment” which, in Emerson’s view, proves capable of solving the most intractable
problems of scriptural interpretation (RWE, 1838, 76; Grusin, 1991, 76). Whatever once
happened in the Hebrews’ ancient homeland, the actual events matter less than the
pages devoted to them in a volume whose “value” is entirely contingent on the uses to
which  it  is  put  by  later  generations  when  they  approach  it  with  the  benefit  of
hindsight,  especially  when  it  comes  to  the  “stereotyped  language”  into  which  the
“evanescing images of thought” all too easily degenerate (682):
What have I to do […] with jasper and sardonyx, beryl and chalcedony; what with
arks and passovers, ephahs and ephods; […] chariots of fire, dragons crowned and
horned,  behemoth  and  unicorn?  Good  for  orientals,  these  are  nothing  to  me.
(683-84) 
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2 The discerning reader  should  reject  the  Bible’s  “foreign rhetoric”  to  focus  on “the
moral sentiment” it conveys (683)—a recommendation ultimately based on the time-
honored  distinction  between  “mode”  and  “essence,”  between  the  “literal”  and
“universal” senses of allegorical writing (675), which plays a central role in Christian
theology. 
3 However  familiar  it  may  have  become  in  the  meantime,  Emerson’s  argument  was
original enough to have occasioned a lively controversy when he presented it in 1838 in
the  so-called  “Divinity  School  Address”;  in  particular,  his insistence  that  the
mechanical  application of  correct  hermeneutic  procedures does not  in and of  itself
produce correct readings of Scripture was calculated to alienate both Trinitarian and
Unitarian scholars, who had few other points of agreement (Grusin, 1991, 76). And yet,
even at his most inflammatory, Emerson seemingly held fast to traditional assumptions
whose reliability appeared increasingly dubious, as a series of developments in ancient
Near Eastern philology forced a reconsideration of what it  means to “read” ancient
Biblical texts. Starting in the late eighteenth century, the progressive decipherment of
scripts and languages once used in and near Palestine meant that the Biblical canon no
longer represented, or would soon cease to represent, the sole source of direct textual
information on the ancient Near East.1 Thus, the Bible could not stand on its own for an
entire “chapter in universal history”; even more significantly perhaps, Old Testament
Hebrew, and the alphabet used to notate it, no longer represented the sole entry point
into an otherwise silent world of mysterious, unreadable inscriptions. This scientific
revolution  drew  attention  to  the  semiotic  properties  of  scripts  which  are  neither
strictly nor exclusively alphabetical, such as Egyptian hieroglyphs. At the same time, it
raised unforeseen questions  about  the Hebrew and Latin alphabets,  whose defining
features could no longer be confused with the universal properties of all writing, but
were  seen  to  result  from  contingent  choices.  Traditionally,  Biblical  exegesis  had
concerned itself with the problem of correct interpretation, with finding ways in which
the right meanings can be recovered from texts whose letter often appears ambiguous
and confusing; the “Divinity School Address” is Emerson’s most striking contribution to
this  debate.  Advances in Near Eastern philology raised a  different  set  of  questions:
What does it mean for a text to be read at all, let alone to be read well? What are the
steps  that  must  be  taken  in  order  to  ensure  its  basic  legibility  before  correct
interpretation  becomes  an  issue?  While  the  two  lines  of  inquiry  can  be  pursued
simultaneously, as indeed they are in Emerson’s essays, they turn out, in his case, to
lead in rather different directions, causing perceptible strain whenever the study of
ancient scripts undermines cherished assumptions about the nature of language and
writing. The purpose of this essay will be to explore some of these tensions as they
complicate Emerson’s account of the semiotic nature of language, affect his already
troubled relationship with contemporary scholarship, and shape his response to his
own writing, in a manner which strikes the twenty-first century reader as strikingly
modern. 
 
“Reading” the Bible: Decipherment vs. Interpretation
4 Emerson’s interest in the new school of Biblical exegesis known as “higher criticism” is
well documented and has been explored by a number of scholars (Packer, 1986; Grusin,
1991). Encouraged by recent philological discoveries, the rise of higher criticism made
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it possible to confront Biblical passages, treated as texts written by human agents in
specific  situations,  with  other  Near  Eastern sources.  Emerson  reflects  upon  this
development when he refers to the Bible as a “chapter” in an ongoing series, implicitly
recognizing that it can no longer be considered as a self-contained, autonomous work
requiring no contextualization. However, this aspect of the question is not what most
directly preoccupies him, not least because the decipherment of ancient languages was
a slow and painstaking process that did not yield useful results until the second half of
the nineteenth century,  by which time he had already published most of his major
works.2 To  Emerson,  the  real  problem lies in  the  unexpected light  cast  by  modern
philological science on what makes a text legible, regardless of what it turns out to
mean. When he comments on proper and improper responses to the Bible in his essay
on Swedenborg, Emerson takes it for granted that the letter of the text is not itself
elusive, whatever may be said of its spiritual significance: however unfamiliar to most
readers, the terms “sardonyx” and “ephod” have supposedly “literal” meanings which
the present-day writer can safely discard because they are clearly tied to a particular
context  in  ways  that  do  not  compromise  their  broader  allegorical  value.  No  such
assumptions can be made about Egyptian hieroglyphs,  both because many Egyptian
words  were  (and  remain  to  this  day)  obscure,  and  because  the  very  notion  of
“literalness” appears problematic in connection with a writing system composed of
symbols that cannot be adequately described as “letters.” The Hebrew, Greek, and Latin
alphabets consist of abstract shapes whose primary function is to notate phonemes; as
such,  they  radically  differ  from hieroglyphic  script,  which  combines  phonetic  with
logographic  components  and  comprises  elements  that  can  be  understood  as
representations of various objects. Therein lies the difficulty to which Emerson refers
in the opening page of Nature when he writes that “[e]very man’s condition is a solution
in  hieroglyphic  to  those  inquiries  he  would  put”:  “he  acts  it  as  life,  before  he
apprehends it as truth” (RWE, 1836, 7). Although no longer illegible, hieroglyphs afford,
at best, a delayed access to truth, not because their meaning is in itself obscure (what
humans “act  as  life,”  humans can also “apprehend” intellectually),  but  because the
logic that governs its expression is disconcertingly alien, requiring a far greater effort
than the alphabets to which we have become accustomed since Biblical times. 
5 Throughout his career, Emerson held firm to the belief that the test of a “true theory”
is  “that  it  will  explain  all  phenomena”  (RWE,  1836,  7):  the  ultimate  purpose of  all
intellectual endeavor is to reach for the invisible beyond the visible and to grasp the
general principles underlying “accidental picture[s] of the truth,” as he writes in his
essay on Swedenborg (RWE, 1850, 682). In particular, this applies to speech and writing,
which “clothe” thought in “images”: 
A man conversing in earnest, if he watch his intellectual processes, will find that a
material image, more or less luminous, arises in his mind, cotemporaneous with
every thought, which furnishes the vestment of the thought. Hence, good writing
and brilliant discourse are perpetual allegories. (RWE, 1836, 23) 
6 Passages such as this one support John T. Irwin’s contention that Emerson subscribed
to  the  “metaphysical”  school  of  interpretation  according  to  which  all  language  is
essentially  emblematic  (Irwin,  1980,  5-6).  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the
argument  offered  here  rests  on  a  number of  assumptions  about  the  relationships
between  written  and  spoken  language,  between  verbal  and  pictorial  expression,
between inner logos and “discourse” or “writing,” which are encouraged by a primary
allegiance to an alphabetical system; for instance, the assertion that wisdom consists in
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the  ability  to  “fasten  words  again  to  visible  things”  (23)  presupposes  that  this
connection has been severed, as is indeed the case when the symbols used in writing
have no obvious representational value. Thus, it is doubly ironic that the “metaphysical
school” had its roots in Renaissance speculation about Egyptian hieroglyphs, described
by Athanasius Kircher as visible emblems of intelligible essences (Irwin, 1980, 5-6); for a
passing acquaintance with Champollion’s account of hieroglyphic writing is enough to
suggest  that  it  was  not  in  any  way  clearer  or  easier  to  read  than  its  alphabetical
counterpart. “As we go back in history, language becomes more picturesque, until its
infancy, when it is all poetry; or all spiritual facts are represented by natural symbols,”
Emerson  writes  in  Nature (22)—a  claim  both  confirmed  and  undermined  by  his
generation’s  experience  of  Egyptian  script,  whose  decipherment  required  hitherto
unparalleled  feats  of  philological  acumen  even  though  its  “picturesque”  quality  is
everywhere apparent. 
7 All this sits uneasily with Emerson’s understanding of the Biblical canon, as it makes it
impossible  to  cast  aside “the dead scurf  of  Hebrew antiquity” (RWE,  1875,  306),  its
antiquated language,  and obsolete imagery,  in favor of  its  forward-looking spiritual
message. A “solution in hieroglyphic,” the record of human experience—the Bible, for
instance—is perfectly capable of providing answers to the questions that preoccupy us
today;  but  reaching  for  these  answers  implies  devoting  more,  rather  than  less,
attention  to  the  modes  of  inscription  on  which  the  ancient  writers  relied,  and
recognizing that the letter of the text resists all attempts at discarding it as a mere
“accident”  of  expression,  a  quaint  “vestment”  in  which  enduring  truths  are
provisionally  cloaked.  This  realization  has  important  consequences,  as  Emerson’s
careful  wording  suggests.  Traditional  readings  of  the  Bible  contrast  Egypt  and  the
Hebrews, the land of slavery and the chosen people in search of freedom; likewise,
Emerson extols the “intuition of the moral sentiment,” emphasizing that interpretation
cannot be restrained by “the dead letter  of  historical  authority” (Grusin,  1991, 76):
“that is knowledge, which is for our liberation” (RWE, 1850, 685). However, by stating
that “hieroglyphics” offer a solution to “every man’s condition,” he also implies that
the priestly script of Egypt continues to shed light on the whole of human history,
including  that  of  the  liberated  Hebrews  and  their  modern  counterparts.  Thus,
hieroglyphs cannot, strictly speaking, be described as an ancient, near-forgotten script
that long ago “retir[ed] from its prominence, before western modes of thought and
expression” (RWE, 1850, 683); instead, they exemplify an aspect of all writing, either as
remnants of  the “picturesque language” spoken by humankind in its  “infancy” and
revived later by the wisest authors or, less reassuringly, as examples of what happens
to words once they are “sculptured,” “fixed,” and “perverted” (682). To put it bluntly,
without a “dead letter” there is simply nothing for us to read, and the Bible, like all
written  documents,  carries  within  itself  the  Egypt  that  its  writers  congratulated
themselves on having left behind. 
8 Richard  Grusin  states  that  even  in  his  most  antinomian  moments,  Emerson  never
conceived  of  the  solution  to  his  spiritual  problems  as  the  outright  rejection  of  all
institutional authority (Grusin, 1991, 3); he appealed to “moral truth,” an authority so
fundamentally institutional that it appeared to be innate (6). Likewise, one could argue
that even when he questions the literalist impulse that all  too often results in “the
incongruous  importation  of  a  foreign  rhetoric”  (RWE,  1850,  683),  Emerson  never
considers  doing  away  with  the  letter  of ancient  texts; instead,  he  proposes  to
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reexamine the ways in which letters actually work, bearing in mind that all writing
systems are arbitrary and provisional, and that their very arbitrariness is essential to
the survival of writing as an institution since it is impossible to write at all without
committing oneself to some kind of system, be it hieroglyphic or alphabetical: all one
ever encounters are individual “modes” of a sacred “essence” which never exists in
isolation (683). This complex endeavor accounts for his ambivalent attitude towards
hieroglyphs, which he simultaneously approaches in two very different and seemingly
contradictory ways. On the one hand, they remind him that all forms of expression are
likely  to  be  superseded in  the  long run,  helping  us  distinguish  between “universal
wisdom” and the merely parochial (683). On the other hand, hieroglyphs stand for the
error into which we are always in danger of falling whenever we lose sight of this fact,
preferring the “symbol” to the many meanings it is capable of generating (683). Thus
perceived, hieroglyphs are not exclusively associated with ancient Egypt; they embody
“literature” at its worst, which manifests itself whenever “visible things” are seen as an
end in themselves instead of  being apprehended as  allegories  of  a  higher,  invisible
truth: “Literature is a poor trick when it busies itself to make words pass for things”
(RWE, 1840, 334). 
9 Ultimately,  this  complicates  Emerson’s  view  of  the  Biblical  canon  as  a  historical
document, since it raises important questions about the human perception of time and
consequently forces a reexamination of what “history” means. To a certain extent, the
experience of hieroglyphic writing is undeniably temporal, since it involves a deferral
of  meaning,  a  latency  period  to  be  traversed  before  the  promised  truth  becomes
accessible. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that hieroglyphs are historical
artifacts;  rather,  Emerson’s  argument  suggests  that  history  is  what  happens  when
successive generations of readers struggle with the obscurities of hieroglyphic writing
and  seek  release  from  the  tyranny  of  reified  symbolism.  Properly  understood,  the
history of Biblical scholarship, in the full Emersonian sense of an activity that befits
“Man Thinking” (RWE,  1837,  63),  is  a  narrative of  emancipation from “this  eastern
monarchy of a Christianity, which indolence and fear have built” (RWE, 1838, 81); like
the Pyramids, the “petrified” expressions of insincere “admiration and love” that now
surround the person of Jesus stand for a kind of slavery: “the friend of man is made [by
them] the injurer of man” (81). The institutional Church, “historical Christianity” (80),
carries much of the blame, as the “Divinity School Address” makes abundantly clear.
However, the fact is that the Bible lends itself all too readily to such a misreading due
to  the  extraordinary  “idioms”  and  the  potentially  obfuscating  “rhetoric  of  its
language,” that is to say the very features that make it so persuasive (80). Thus, the true
goal of philology should be the same as that of all political revolutions, to resist these
undue impositions and help “new lands” and “new men” create their “own works and
laws and worship” (RWE, 1836, 7). 
10 Paradoxically,  Emerson’s  argument  thus  appears  to  de-historicize  the  Bible  and  to
downplay its indebtedness to a particular place and time, even as he takes advantage of
recent scholarly advances to address the enduring presence of a past that continues to
exert  a  deadening  influence  on  current  thinking:  as  the  example  of  Egyptian
hieroglyphs suggests,  all  attempts at breathing new life into old writings inevitably
leave the reader groping among “dry bones” that  refuse to  be resurrected,  despite
Ezechiel’s assurances to the contrary (7). Thus, Emerson appears to struggle with an
insoluble  conundrum,  as  he  hesitates  between  a  vision  of  history  as  allegory—of
historical  events,  and  their  written  accounts,  as  representations  of  the  unending
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human quest for intellectual and spiritual emancipation—and a vision of allegory as
history, of the successive stages in human development as an ongoing confrontation
with the  treachery  inherent  in  all  forms of  symbolism (including writing),  without
which thought would come to a standstill. 
 
History and the Semiotics of Writing
11 Emerson’s  ambivalence  about  history,  and  specifically  about  the  historicity  of
Scripture,  largely  accounts  for  his  troubled  relationship  with  much  contemporary
thought—with New England theologians of every stripe, as is well known, but also, and
no less  significantly,  with  current  advances  in  Biblical  scholarship,  even when one
would have thought them compatible with his interest in language and his rejection of
“parish disputes” (RWE, 1850, 684). One explanation might be that Emerson’s interest in
the Biblical past takes second place to his preoccupation with the semiotics of writing,
and especially with the nature of his own activity as a writer, in the light of which he
tends to assess all his other epistemological concerns. 
12 Emerson shared modern philology’s refusal to worship the letter of the Bible in the
name of  the  respect  due  to  Scripture;  but  this  tactical  alliance  did  not  extend  far
beyond a common rejection of literalism, and there is no indication that he was in any
way interested in studying Hebrew history for its own sake or in exploring the world of
the  ancient  texts,  unlike  the  nineteenth-century  scholars  who  examined  the
relationship between the historical or archaeological record of actual events and the
accounts given in the Bible. At the time when Emerson was at work on his major essays,
the  weakening of  Ottoman rule  at  last  made it  possible  for  Americans  to  travel  to
Palestine  in  search  of traces  of  the  Biblical  past.  Edward  Robinson  (1794-1863)
journeyed twice to the Holy Land, in 1838 and 1852; his five-volume account of his
discoveries,  Biblical  Researches  in  Palestine (1841-52),  became  a  bestseller  whose
popularity was eclipsed only by the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Goldman,
2004, 152). Robinson’s endeavor signaled a paradigm shift in Biblical research, as he
was  motivated  both  by  an  interest  in  German-style  historical  criticism and  by  the
desire to demonstrate the veracity of Biblical narratives (152-3); his aim was to develop
a new form of Christian apologetics reconciling faith and archaeological knowledge,
and  he  was  accompanied,  on  his  first  journey,  by  the  missionary  Eli  Smith  (154).
Emerson took no part in this intellectual revolution. There is no indication that he ever
took any interest in Robinson’s innovative field work; to him, Palestine remained a
purely textual  entity,  a  literary creation testifying to the greatness of  the “Hebrew
muse,” the province of the “Christian symbol” (RWE, 1850, 683)—a term which, in this
instance, itself recalls a well-known text, the Symbolum Nicaenum, the Nicene Creed in
which the early Church sought to present the fundamental tenets of the Christian faith.
13 Up to a point, Emerson’s attitude can be described as theologically and philologically
conservative. A trained minister, he was responsive to the moral message of Scripture,
which he approached in a spirit that prefigures Cavellian perfectionism, convinced that
regular contact with the Bible helped the reader make ever further advances on the
road to spiritual and ethical excellence. As he describes her, the “Hebrew muse” sings
in a distinctly didactic strain; he gives her credit for “[teaching] the lore of right and
wrong to men” (RWE, 1850, 683), and the “Divinity School Address” shows him looking
for “the new Teacher” who will complete the task of educating humankind, begun by
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Jesus and,  before him, by the Old Testament prophets (RWE, 1838,  92).  Thus,  to all
intents  and  purposes,  Emerson  remains  scrupulously  faithful  to  the  Augustinian
tradition of Biblical hermeneutics, as he lays stress on the relationship between the
text and a reader who, from the beginning, demonstrates a willingness to approach it
in the light of Christ’s teachings (Yarchin, 2004, xviii-xix). Everything begins with the
experience of conversion, while the ultimate goal lies in meditation and good works;
Scripture  provides  the  necessary  mediation,  as  the  reader  is  encouraged  to  reach
beyond its literal meaning in search of insights relevant to the present moment—hence
the emphasis on allegory, on the quest for a higher, living truth above and beyond the
text’s historical relevance. 
14 True,  Emerson’s  conservatism  in  this  regard  is  by  no  means  confident  or
unproblematic: he increasingly appears to view Palestine, whatever the name means to
him,  as  a  question  and  not  just  as  a  repository  of  answers,  of  “innumerable
christianities,  humanities,  [and] divinities” yet  to be discovered in its  bosom (RWE,
1850,  683).  While  at  Harvard,  he was made aware of  new developments  in  German
philology by Edward Everett (1794-1865), a Göttingen graduate who taught that religion
is the expression of philosophical thought in mythological guise (Richardson, 1995, 13);
in addition, the young Emerson read key works by Robert Lowth (Lectures on the Sacred
Poetry of the Hebrews, 1787) and Thomas Blackwell (Life and Writings of Homer, 1735), both
of them early advocates of “higher criticism” who held that the poetic and prophetic
functions are essentially  identical,  as  evidenced by both the Greek and the Hebrew
literary  traditions  (Richardson,  1995,  12).  His  reminder,  in  the  “Divinity  School
Address,”  that  the  Christian  Bible  is  actually  a  bilingual  book  consisting  of  “[t]he
Hebrew and Greek Scriptures” (RWE, 1838, 91),  his pointed reference to “the poetic
teaching of Greece and Egypt,” which he compares to the Christian “Mythus” (80), and
his tribute to the Hebrew “muse” (RWE, 1850, 683)—a deity more commonly associated
with Mount Parnassus than with Pisgah or Sinai—thus suggest that the Biblical writings
should  properly  be  placed  in  the  broader  context  of  an  anthropology  of  ancient
Mediterranean cultures. 
15 This,  however,  is  not  a  project  to  which  Emerson  actually  devotes  his  energies,
convinced though he may be of its epistemological validity: his attention never strays
far from the Biblical text itself,  and any insights gleaned from other disciplines are
immediately  reinterpreted  in  hermeneutic  terms.  While  higher  criticism  seeks  to
demonstrate that Scripture fulfills a spiritual impulse common to many civilizations,
bolstering Emerson’s argument that the Bible should be approached with an eye to the
universal rather than to the purely local, he does not see this as an invitation to engage
in what we would now term comparative mythology, but directs his attention to the
ways in which this tension manifests itself on a semiotic level as a conflict between
abstract ideas and cosmic meanings on the one hand, and, on the other, trivial, context-
bound symbolism reflecting life as lived in a specific cultural setting. 
The piety of the Hebrew prophets purges their grossness. The circumcision is an
example of the power of poetry to raise the low and offensive. Small and mean
things  serve  as  well  as  great  symbols.  The  meaner  the  type  by  which  a  law is
expressed, the more pungent it is, and the more lasting in the memories of men.
(RWE, 1844a, 454-5) 
16 What is at stake here is not so much the record of past human experience as the Word
itself, the language of divine instruction which points to “the eternal revelation in the
heart” (RWE, 1838, 80) by treating “low and offensive” symbols as vehicles of superior
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truths.  To the extent  that  history enters  the picture at  all,  it  does  so  on a  strictly
speculative level when Emerson accounts for the inadequacies of institutional religion
by  sketching  out  a  narrative  of  usurpation  and  decline:  “The  idioms  of  [Jesus’]
language,  and the figures  of  his  rhetoric,  have usurped the place  of  his  truth;  and
churches  are  not  built  on his  principles,  but  on his  tropes”  (80).  The point  of  this
statement is not to convince the reader that the early Church, or indeed the Apostles
themselves,  understood  Jesus’  teachings  more  clearly  than  nineteenth-century
Christians were capable of doing; in fact, one strand of Emerson’s argument suggests
the  opposite,  when  he  proclaims  his  faith  in  the  spread  and  development  of
Christianity in America (RWE, 1838, 91-2; Grusin, 1991, 74). Instead, his intention is to
describe in narrative form the ambiguous and ever-present relationship between the
“law” and its “type,” understood as the “small  and mean thing” whose “grossness”
both conveys and obfuscates the inspiring message of great poetry. Emerson’s “ages”
are not to be understood as historical eras in the usual sense; they are epochs of the
mind, moments in a quasi-dialectical progression, metaphors of conflicting forces that
remain present at all times, vying for supremacy: 
There  is  no  doctrine  of  the  Reason  which  will  bear  to  be  taught  by  the
Understanding. The understanding caught this high chant from the poet’s lips, and
said, in the next age, “This was Jehovah come down out of heaven. I will kill you, if
you say he was a man.” (RWE, 1838, 80) 
17 Here, Emerson’s brand of history is the same as Rousseau’s; in fact, there is a clear
similarity between the argument offered in this passage and Rousseau’s Essay on the
Origin of Languages, which states that speech and song, meaning and expression, were
initially welded since every word uttered by early humans came straight from the heart
(Rousseau, 1781, 103). As in Rousseau, the point is not so much the factual accuracy of
this narrative as its ability to illuminate and allegorize the present state of affairs. 
18 In the end, Emerson’s meditations on the ancient Near East invariably contribute to a
reconsideration  of  reading  and writing—acquiring,  in  the  process,  a  distinctly  self-
reflective cast as they come to illuminate his own authorial practice by comparison
with his forebears. When he discusses the Bible, he does not do so in order to confirm
its factual accuracy; for him, there is no point in seeking out tangible proofs of the
Bible’s veracity, which is of a wholly different order—the spirit speaks for itself, and is
its own evidence. It is far more useful to note that the fate of the Biblical writings is not
unprecedented, and that a similar treatment has been inflicted on other poetic and
religious canons. “Christianity became a Mythus, as the poetic teaching of Greece and
of Egypt, before” (RWE, 1838, 80). Incompetent readers are certainly to blame, but the
very fact that the same mistake has been made several times in different situations
suggests that the ancient texts themselves can, to some extent, be held responsible, if
only because they are not content with expressing divine “principles,” but invariably
shroud them in “tropes” that tend to divert attention from their actual import. One
such trope is narrativity: “principles” are not allowed to stand on their own, but give
rise  to  stories  which seek  to  explain  various  aspects  of  the  human condition,  thus
encouraging readers to describe in terms of linearity and succession a divine impulse
that  actually  operates  in  an  essentially  discontinuous  manner  and  “evermore  goes
forth anew,” disregarding its earlier manifestations (80). 
19 Obviously,  this  is  just  what Emerson himself  does on numerous occasions,  not only
when he laments Christianity’s dogmatic bent, but, more broadly speaking, whenever
he attempts to consider the general drift of human affairs. Theological disagreements
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notwithstanding, Emerson remains enough of a Christian to share an apocalyptic and
soteriological view of history; he awaits a “Teacher” who will fulfill Jesus’ prophecies by
demonstrating  the  essential  oneness  of  ethics,  aesthetics,  and  knowledge.  To  that
extent,  he  demonstrates  his  attachment  to  what  François  Hartog  would  term  a
“futuristic” regime of historicity, one according to which the present and the past only
become intelligible in the light of a later revelation (Hartog, 2003, 16); and this futurism
governs his own practice as a narrator, for instance in the famous concluding sentence
of “Experience,” with its pointed use of the future tense: “the true romance which the
world  exists  to  realize,  will  be  the  transformation  of  genius  into  practical  power”
(RWE, 1844b, 492). The example of Scripture suggests that this Emersonian “Mythus” is
just as capable of giving rise to a fossilized creed as anything to be found in the Bible;
therefore,  it  necessitates,  as  an  antidote,  a  much  darker  counter-narrative  whose
subject  is  the  unceasing  accumulation  of  ossified  tropes  and  lifeless  symbols  as
humankind makes its way forward. 
[The] Hebrew muse […] had the same excess of influence for [Swedenborg], it has
had for the nations. […] The genius of Swedenborg […] wasted itself in the endeavor
to reanimate and conserve what had already arrived at its natural term, and, in the
great secular Providence, was retiring from its prominence, before western modes
of thought and expression. (RWE, 1850, 683)
20 Every time the human race takes one step in the direction of greater enlightenment, its
discarded beliefs and the antiquated language in which it once chose to voice them are
added to the giant dust-heap that is history itself, understood as the repository of ideas
that  once  were  alive,  but  have  lost  all  relevance  now  that  they  no  longer  meet  a
genuine spiritual need. “Miracles, prophecy, poetry; the ideal life, the holy life, exist as
ancient  history merely” once faith has deserted them (RWE,  1838,  79).  Swedenborg
mistook  the  quaint  remains  of  dead  beliefs  for  the  early  manifestations  of  a  new
spiritual  awakening;  hence  his  insistence  on  retrospection,  on  the  artificial
preservation of “a poetry and philosophy […] of tradition” rather than “insight” (RWE,
1836, 7). Emerson refuses to make the same error, but this forces him to dwell on the
dark side of human experience, if only for the sake of contrast and in order to make his
point sufficiently clear. While he complains that “[o]ur age is retrospective,” he cannot
wholly exempt himself from this general condemnation, and the first object he dwells
upon is “the sepulchres of the fathers,” much as he would prefer to roam the fields in
search of “wool and flax” (7). 
 
Hieroglyphs and the Question of Meaningful
Expression
21 This  is  the  point  at  which  the  question  of  hieroglyphic  writing  becomes  crucial.
Hieroglyphs are an ideal metaphor for the complications inherent in allegorical modes
of  expression  and  interpretation,  for  the  ever  growing  tension  between  an  eager
anticipation of the advent of truth and a retrospective inquiry into the lost meaning of
discarded  and,  by  now,  largely  unintelligible  tropes.  “Every  man’s  condition  is  a
solution in hieroglyphic to those inquiries he would put. He acts it as life, before he
apprehends it as truth” (RWE, 1836, 7). Hieroglyphs stand for the time “before,” for a
script  once  familiar  to  the  literate,  but  falsely  believed  to  be  illegible  after  many
centuries of disuse—and these remnants of a bygone age are to be approached in the
light of  what comes after them, of a “truth” they have always heralded in ways to
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which  everyone  long  remained  oblivious.  Thus,  “hieroglyphics”  crystallize  the
ambiguous  temporality  of  interpretation:  no  matter  how  forward-looking,  it  is
perpetually shadowed by the past, which somehow manages to remain enigmatic and
forbidding even when it turns out to have found the “solution” to questions yet to be
formulated. 
22 However,  this  isolated  but  highly  visible  reference  to  hieroglyphs  also  expresses  a
deeper anxiety about the possibility of meaningful expression, in ways to which the
scenario outlined above does not do full justice. To interpret Emerson’s statement in
the  manner  that  has  just  been  attempted  is  to  assume  that  the  main  difficulty  is
tropological—that hieroglyphs are tropes, that their eventful history can be turned into
a convenient allegory, and that what they most convincingly stand for is allegory itself,
language’s  propensity  to  cloak  meaning  in  figures,  the  “mean types”  out  of  which
“great symbols” are fashioned, as Emerson argues in “The Poet” (RWE, 1844a, 454). This
plausible assumption makes sense given the general drift of Emerson’s argument, but it
fails to take into account the peculiar nature of the difficulties with which hieroglyphic
writing, unlike the Biblical canon, confronts the modern reader. Far-ranging questions
may  legitimately  be  raised  about  the  best  ways  of  interpreting  the  Old  and  New
Testaments, but what is not in doubt is that deciphering them requires little more than
a willingness to learn ancient languages and alphabets superficially different from, but
ultimately comparable to, the one in use in the English-speaking world. The case of
ancient  Egyptian  is  qualitatively  different,  for  the  nature  of  the  script  itself  is  a
problem,  raising  unexpected  questions  about  the  function  of  interpretation.  An
alphabetical system relying on abstract shapes, each in theory associated with a sound
present in the spoken language, is not in danger of “mak[ing] words pass for things,” as
bad literature is wont to do (RWE, 1840, 334), since the individual letters are unlikely to
be perceived as pictures of actual objects, let alone to be confused with them; whatever
associations may be culturally established between a given alphabet and the world of
“things,”  these  usually  remain  speculative,  as  shown  by  Talmudic  and  Kabbalistic
theories  about  the  mystical  functions  of  Hebrew letters.  This  is  a  far  cry  from the
difficulties  raised  by  Egyptian  hieroglyphs,  which  mostly  consist  of  signs  that  can
readily be seen as pictograms even though, as Champollion demonstrated, their actual
meaning often bears no discernible relation to what they appear to represent. In other
words, hieroglyphs question the tropological nature of all writing, besides encouraging
the reader to wonder about the rhetorical status of tropes in expressive discourse, a
different issue altogether. 
23 When the key to the ancient Egyptian script was lost, the symbolic meanings of the
texts it notated became a moot point, since they could no longer be read; on the other
hand,  the  pictorial  quality  of  the  writing  itself  came  into  prominence,  causing
numerous authors to theorize that hieroglyphs referred directly to things without the
mediation of words (Parkinson, 1995, 15-6). Well established since the Renaissance, this
mode of thinking had not yet been entirely supplanted by modern scholarship when
Emerson wrote his  most  important essays;  although Champollion’s  discoveries soon
gained wide currency, they continued to attract controversy for several decades, and as
late as 1854, the German-American Egyptologist Gustavus Seyffarth lectured in New
York City on the merits of his alternative theory, showing that Champollion’s ideas still
had some way to go in convincing the scholarly community of their validity (Parkinson,
1995, 41). 
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24 In retrospect, these Neoplatonic speculations can be construed as logocentric fantasies
of pure, unadulterated ideality; Emerson undoubtedly shared them to a certain extent,
believing, as John T. Irwin puts it, that the physical fact serves the spiritual fact (Irwin,
1980, 11). However, they can also give rise to the fear that hieroglyphs bypass ideality
altogether and deny the authority of logos, preferring to establish connections between
material things, between graven images and natural or man-made objects. The latter
interpretation  is  entirely  consonant  with  Emerson’s  pessimistic  take  on  antiquated
modes of expression and thought: if it is correct, hieroglyphs can be described as tropes
concealing tropes—as reified pictures enclosing, as in a hermetically sealed casket, the
dead rhetoric  of  an ancient  priestly  class  whose irrelevant  beliefs  have faded from
human memory along with the language in which they were once articulated. Indeed, it
is  doubtful whether hieroglyphs, thus understood, still  constitute tropes,  since they
“pass for things” to the point where it becomes unclear whether they have anything to
do with words.  In  this  light,  hieroglyphs  mark the  limit  between the  realm of  the
“universal soul,” as manifested in speech, and the lifeless husk which is all that remains
of nature once it has been stripped of its spiritual associations. “All the facts in natural
history taken by themselves, have no value, but are barren, like a single sex” (RWE,
1836, 21). 
25 It would be tempting to state that hieroglyphs are an isolated case if Emerson did not
stress that they shed light on “every man’s condition,” and if he did not argue, in a
later section of Nature, that all language is susceptible to death and decay, like the
ancient Egyptian tongue, and for the same reasons. 
When simplicity of character and the sovereignty of ideas is broken up […], the
power over nature as an interpreter of the will, is in a degree lost; new imagery
ceases to be created, and old words are perverted to stand for things which are not;
a paper currency is employed, when there is no bullion in the vaults. (22) 
26 Bearing in mind that the word “character” can be understood in an ethical sense as a
synonym for “personality,” but also as an allusion to the symbols used in writing, this
statement  aptly  describes  the  decline  of  hieroglyphic  script,  which  rejects  the
“sovereignty of ideas” and compromises language in its entirety, much as inflation, the
lack of sufficient bullion, threatens to make money worthless. The only way of healing
this “rotten diction” is to “fasten words again to visible things” (23), i.e. to restore a
connection that hieroglyphs were supposed to guarantee, but which they eventually
tended to undermine. Whenever a true poet proves equal to the task, he—Emerson’s
preferred pronoun—shows himself to be “a man in alliance with truth and God,” like
Moses whose “good writing and brilliant discourse” rescued the Hebrew people from
slavery in Egypt (23). Ironically, the great prophet’s successors—and, by implication,
Moses himself—thus fulfill  their  mission by creating another Egypt within the very
language they deploy as they leave behind the land of the Pharaohs and turn their
backs on a “long-civilized” but decadent nation, dissatisfied with its utter inability to
“clothe one thought in its natural garment” (22). 
 
“Speaking with the Dead”: History and the Pragmatics
of Writing
27 All  this confirms that  the reality  (past  or  present)  of  the Near  East,  the lessons of
biblical archaeology, and the latest advances in Egyptological research have no bearing
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on  Emerson’s  argument,  except  in  so  far  as  they  shed  light  on  the  complex
relationships  between thought,  language,  and writing,  which are  his  real  center  of
interest. To him, the East is not so much an actual place as it is a near-paradigmatic
example of the factors affecting any poetic or prophetic enterprise, including his own.
His ancient Near East  is  first  and foremost a mental  construct,  a  theoretical  model
meant  to  challenge dogmatic  theology.  As  such,  it  is  indebted to  modern scientific
approaches,  which  likewise  question  entrenched  attitudes  and  beliefs;  however,
archaeology  and  textual  criticism  cease  to  interest  him  as  soon  as  they  lead  in
directions different  from those he wishes to  take,  and in particular  whenever they
describe history in positive terms, as valuable in its own right and not just as the dark
obverse of the human spirit’s aspiration to a higher visionary state. To that extent,
Emerson’s project partakes of Orientalism, defined by Edward Said as “a created body
of theory and practice,” “a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for
filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness” that can be construed as “a
sign of  European-Atlantic  power” (Said,  1978,  6);  for  while  Emerson did not  devote
much attention to recent developments in regions such as Egypt and Palestine (then at
a turning point in its eventful history, as British influence in the Levant was on the
ascendant due to the weakening of Ottoman rule), his insistence that Eastern culture
has  long  “retired  from  its  prominence,  before  western  modes  of  thought  and
expression” (RWE, 1850, 683) provides a handy justification for the colonial enterprises
then under way. True, it is important to realize that Emerson’s disparaging comments
on the inevitable decline of Oriental civilization are mainly intended as a critique of
European (and, by extension, American) literature and philosophy. His real target is not
the  East  or  its  religious  and  poetic  legacy,  but  the  Western  thinkers  who,  like
Swedenborg, insist on borrowing an extinct phraseology from writings whose interest
is by and large of an antiquarian nature; Emerson’s aim is not to instill in Westerners a
sense of their unfailing superiority, but rather to goad them into taking better care of
their own spiritual needs. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the Orient/Occident
dichotomy, understood as “an ontological and epistemological distinction” (Said, 1978,
2), persistently informs his discussions of the Christian West’s biblical heritage, in a
manner that certainly cannot be considered as innocuous. 
28 That  being  said,  the  most  troubling  ambiguity  inherent  in  Emerson’s  argument
concerns  his  largely  negative  portrayal  of  Judaism,  whose  reliance  on  “arks,”
“passovers”  (shorn  of  their  capital  P)  (RWE,  1850,  683),  and  supposedly  “obscene”
symbols such as ritual circumcision (RWE, 1844a, 454), repeatedly comes in for sharp, if
largely indirect, criticism. 
29 To some extent, this can be explained by Emerson’s lack of exposure to, and consequent
ignorance of,  the living realities  of  Judaism. As Shalom Goldman points out,  Jewish
presence in the United States was virtually non-existent until the 1830s, and the first
major wave of Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe did not begin until the early
1880s (Goldman, 2004, 112), by which time Emerson’s career was over (he died in 1882).
Thus, his knowledge of Judaism was essentially, if not indeed exclusively, bookish, and
he remained largely indebted to the long line of Christian Hebraists whose American
origins  coincide  with  the  founding  of  Harvard  College  (9).  Goldman  describes  the
ambivalent attitude that these scholars adopted towards Hebraic sources. On the one
hand, they relied on Jewish writers for information on the world and language of the
Old Testament; on the other hand, they argued that the Christian faith was intrinsically
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superior to Judaism, and therefore tended to treat their Jewish contemporaries with
indifference (12),  when they did not actively attempt to convert them—in 1820, the
American  Society  for  Meliorating  the  Condition of  the  Jews  was  founded  for  that
purpose by one J. C. S. Frey (1771-1850), himself a Jewish convert to Christianity (95).
Up to a point, Emerson conforms to this well-established pattern, for instance when he
argues that the Bible conveys a universal wisdom not to be confused with the obsolete
ways in which it  is  expressed:  this  implies  that  the truth contained in the Hebrew
Scriptures can be claimed neither by the Hebrews themselves nor by their Jewish heirs
as their exclusive property, and may even be taken to suggest that the “eastern men”
mentioned in the “Divinity School Address” are unable to do full justice to their own
Scriptures (RWE, 1838, 91). In this regard, Emerson’s position is far from original, save
in  his  insistence  that  the  Christian  churches  are  not  immune  from  a  similar
condemnation, that the faith they stand for is still too “Eastern,” too respectful of the
letter of the Biblical text, and too indifferent to its spirit. 
30 However, the importance of these contextual factors should not be overstated, and the
key to Emerson’s quarrel with Judaism is linked to a philosophical disagreement that
cannot be entirely explained away as a sign that he shared the prejudices of his time.
Alfred Kazin makes remarks to this effect in a diary entry dated 1969: 
RWE  believes  that  nature  is  something  for  men  to  think  with.  It  is
comprehensibility (and in his case expressiveness) incarnate. It is the beginning of
“natural” thinking—thinking according to nature, by the light of nature, according
to the (great) book of nature. Everything is open—everything is possible. There is
nothing inherently different from men (witness Plato’s eternal realm), only the first
cause (which too lurks in nature—at the end of the labyrinth so to speak.)
What  has  always  bothered me in  all  this  is  the  applicability  and practicality  of
everything. There is sublimity of course, but no mystery. Whereas nothing is so
obvious  about  the  Jewish  condition (to  say  nothing  about  the  Jew’s  God)  as  its
mystery. (in LaRocca, 2013, 616)
31 Emerson’s account of the Hebrew Bible lays stress on its fundamental intelligibility.
Although he is aware of the difficulties involved in bringing to life such an ancient text,
and  while  he  implies  that  they  are,  in  part,  to  be  blamed  on  the  self-defeating
tendencies  inherent  in  all  forms  of  expression,  a  full  understanding  and  lucid
presentation of  universal  truths  remains  the ultimate goal;  as  to  the Biblical  text’s
many obscurities, he views them either as imperfections in need of a corrective or as
inevitable,  but  temporary,  obstacles  on  the  way  to  enlightenment.  Ultimately,  this
argument  is  predicated  on  the  belief  that  Scripture’s  purportedly  divine  origin  is
essentially irrelevant to the scholar since God is another name for the spirit at work in
the depths of the human soul,  and is  therefore present in all  poetry worthy of the
name. This accounts for Emerson’s view that “hieroglyphics,” taken as a synecdoche for
writing in all its forms, are akin to a problem in need of an ingenious “solution” (RWE,
1836, 7): what God says or does, humans can comprehend, as they are essentially one
and the same. Nothing could be further removed from the Jewish belief that the Biblical
text uniquely records the ancient prophets’ dealings with a transcendent power whose
essence lies beyond human comprehension, and that the letter of the sacred text, no
less than its meaning, partakes of a mystery deserving of infinite respect. 
32 Ultimately,  Emerson’s  philosophical  disagreement with Jewish readings of  the Bible
reflects divergent conceptions of the relationship between writing and divine Law. “I
would write on the lintels of the door-post, Whim. I hope it is somewhat better than
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whim at last, but we cannot spend the day in explanation,” Emerson writes in “Self-
Reliance” (RWE, 1841b, 262), alluding to the Jewish tradition of placing a mezuzah (a
small  capsule  containing a fragment  of  Deuteronomy)  near  the front  door  of  one’s
home in order to invoke divine protection. In Judaism, the mezuzah is a reminder that
believers  must  scrupulously  conform  to  divine  commandments  in  exchange  for
supernatural aid; the ritual itself is a sign of obedience, as the Bible makes it mandatory
(Dt  6:4-9).  Emerson  substitutes  the  word  “whim”  for  the  Scriptural  quotation:  the
imperative to which he must be faithful at all  costs originates neither in prophetic
writings handed down from generation to generation, nor in obedience to the dictates
of  a  transcendent  Deity,  but  in  the  inner  force  that  makes  him  “greatly  listen  to
himself,  withdrawing  himself  from  all  the  accents  of  other  men’s  devotion”  (RWE,
1841a,  399).  According  to  Deuteronomy,  God’s  decrees  guarantee  genuine  freedom
since they stand for the one true Law, as opposed to the false authority wielded by the
Egyptian slaveholders (Dt 6:20-5); the mezuzah is an acknowledgement of this fact (Dt
6:9).  In  “Self-Reliance,”  the  word  inscribed  on  the  door-post  paradoxically  urges
whoever reads it to disobey written orders—a prohibition from which it is exempt since
it  does  not  actually  command anything and mandates  no specific  course  of  action.
Indeed,  it  would  make  no  difference  whatsoever  if  its  meaning  were  eventually
forgotten, or if readers found Emerson’s cursory “explanation” unclear and decided to
act  as  they pleased;  for  in  doing so,  they would unwittingly  carry  out  the  writer’s
recommendation and prove faithful to the spirit of the inscription, even if its letter
eluded them. Thus, Emerson’s subversive mezuzah stands as the ultimate answer to the
errors  into  which  Christian  and  Jewish  exegetes  of  the  Bible  customarily  fall:  a
foolproof piece of  legislation,  it  cannot possibly be misunderstood,  not even by the
illiterate, and serves as a reliable guide to conduct in all circumstances, even when the
people passing by have no inkling of its meaning. 
33 Obviously, it helps that the inscription consists of just one ingeniously chosen word;
this bold combination of a pithily expressed idea and a rhetorical strategy designed to
make interpretation irrelevant probably cannot be sustained any longer (although it
could be argued that Emerson never stops trying—hence the oracular obliqueness of his
prose, which often manages to be both explicit and strangely elusive at the same time
as if to discourage the reader from trying to pinpoint a specific meaning even when
plausible  interpretations  teasingly  suggest  themselves).  This  does  not  diminish  the
importance  of  Emerson’s  claim,  understood  as  a  statement  of  intention  (“I  would
write”). According to him, neither theology nor philology demonstrates the proper use
of the Bible: both value attention to the letter of the text and assess the validity of
particular readings according to their degree of conformity to established hermeneutic
practice,  whereas  Emerson  contends  that  “[w]hoso  would  be  a  man  must  be  a
nonconformist” (RWE, 1841b, 261). The mark of true Emersonian “scholars” is that they
never bow to the demands of “scholarship” in the usual sense of the word, and that any
conflict between interpretive accuracy and “the integrity of [their] own mind[s]” (261)
is fearlessly resolved in favor of the latter. In other words, coming to terms with the
legacy  of  slavery  in  Egypt  means  realizing  that  the  ancient  writings  in  which it  is
commemorated  should  not  intimidate  us  as  the  Pharaohs  enslaved  the  Hebrew
laborers: subjugation to a text, even one that recalls a nation’s epic struggle against
oppression, is no better than subjugation to a tyrant. What saves this argument from
spilling  over  into  needless  provocation  is  that  Emerson  does  not  shrink  from  its
consequences as regards his own work, and tries to distance himself from what is still
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too “Eastern,”  too literalist,  too cryptically  dogmatic,  in  his  own largely  allegorical
discourse.  If,  in  his  view,  ethical  trump epistemological  concerns when it comes to
writing, then it behooves him to act in a responsible manner, showing respect where it
is due—in his relationship to his reader—the better to question the false pieties that all
too often limit our understanding of ancient texts. 
34 Interestingly, while this unconventional attitude appears calculated to exacerbate the
tensions inherent in what were then the dominant modes of Biblical interpretation,
Emerson’s insistence on the pragmatics of reading and writing appears less problematic
in the light  of  more recent  conceptions of  history and archaeology.  Twentieth and
twenty-first century research has challenged the assumption that exploring an extinct
culture  is  akin  to  cracking  a  code,  and  that  deciphering  the  script,  syntax,  and
vocabulary used by ancient writers is enough to understand what they had to say. As
Robert Parkinson points out, texts are cultural and material artifacts, inseparable from
their social context and the means of their production and circulation (Parkinson, 1995,
12). Thus, an excessive preoccupation with the literal meanings of ancient writings is
likely  to  prove  counterproductive:  it  obscures  the  considerable  difference  between
archaeologists  and  cryptanalysts  who,  when  trying  to  decipher  a  message,  usually
know  its  origin,  destination,  and  general  purpose,  unlike  historians  struggling  to
comprehend the full significance of inscriptions whose original context and pragmatic
function  may  be  difficult  to  ascertain,  even  when  the  script  and  language  are
unproblematic  (Parkinson,  1995,  191-5).  In  this  light,  Emerson’s  disregard  for  the
niceties of textual scholarship and preference for readings that emphasize the life of
language  in  actual  communication  may  appear  more  attuned  to  contemporary
preoccupations. Instead of indulging in the fantasy that the scholar can open a window
on the past by means of careful philological research, he stresses that whatever interest
ancient  writings  retain  for  us  today  lies  in  their  contribution  to  present-day
conversations between people who, in good faith, fearlessly desire enlightenment, as
evidenced by “the institution of preaching,—the speech of man to men,” by which we
are urged to “speak the very truth, as […] life and conscience teach it, and cheer the
waiting, fainting hearts of men with new hope and new revelation” (RWE, 1838, 91). Not
unlike twenty-first century scholars, Emerson thus stresses that the true location of
meaning lies not in the texts themselves, but in our ongoing, dynamic exchanges with
and about them: deciphering an ancient document will not bring it to life unless we are
aware of its unique relevance in its present-day context, of the interaction between the
position we adopt in regard to it and what we know of the situation in which it was
originally composed. This may be the closest we can come to “speaking with the dead”
(Parkinson, 1995, 195) in such a way that their voices can be heard again, and their
contributions properly appraised, without drowning out our own. “I look for the hour
when that supreme Beauty, which ravished the souls of those eastern men, and chiefly
of those Hebrews, and through their lips spoke oracles to all time, shall speak in the
West also.” (RWE, 1838, 91) 
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NOTES
1. In 1758, the Phoenician alphabet was deciphered by Jean-Jacques Barthélémy (1716-95) ; then
came  the  turn  of  Egyptian  hieroglyphs,  thanks  to  the  combined  efforts  of  Thomas  Young
(1773-1829)  and  Jean-François  Champollion  (1790-1832).  Soon  afterwards,  cuneiform  was
deciphered by Henry Rawlinson (1810-95) and Sir Edward Hincks (1792-1866), whose task was
more or less complete by the late 1840s.
2. Champollion’s discovery of the key to ancient hieroglyphs is usually thought to have taken
place in 1822, when for the first time he was able to read a royal cartouche whose meaning was
not already known to him from a Greek translation (Parkinson, 1995, 35). However, it still took
him  several  years  to  sketch  out  his  pioneering  grammar  of  ancient  Egyptian,  which  was
posthumously published in 1836, the same year as Emerson’s Nature ; and it was not until 1858
that the full text of the Rosetta Stone became available in an American translation (Parkinson,
1995, 41).
ABSTRACTS
Ancien pasteur unitarien, Ralph Waldo Emerson assimile l’Antiquité proche-orientale à un corpus
de textes (le canon biblique) ; pour lui, elle relève d’une enquête herméneutique, indissociable
d’une réflexion poussée sur la nature et les enjeux de l’écriture et de la lecture. Héritée de la
théologie chrétienne,  cette approche s’appuie sur des présupposés devenus problématiques à
l’heure où les progrès de la philologie jettent un éclairage novateur sur l’histoire de l’écriture,
notamment grâce aux découvertes de Champollion qui permettent de déchiffrer les inscriptions
hiéroglyphiques.  Traditionnellement, l’exégèse  biblique  s’était  jusque-là  donné  pour  tâche
d’élaborer des interprétations correctes, de retrouver la signification exacte de textes dont la
lettre paraît souvent ambiguë et confuse ; le discours connu sous le nom de « Divinity School
Address » constitue la principale contribution d’Emerson à ce débat. Au début du dix-neuvième
siècle, les progrès de la philologie proche-orientale posent des problèmes d’un autre ordre : que
signifie « lire » un texte, et a fortiori le lire « correctement » ? Quelles précautions faut-il prendre
afin de garantir  sa lisibilité minimale avant même que ne se pose la question de la « juste »
interprétation ? Le présent essai tente d’examiner quelques-unes des tensions qui résultent de
cette situation nouvelle. Il s’agit de montrer en quoi elles infléchissent la réflexion d’Emerson sur
la  nature sémiotique du langage,  compliquent  ses  rapports  avec la  pensée contemporaine et
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déterminent l’attitude qu’il adopte vis-à-vis de sa propre écriture, d’une manière qui, du point de
vue du vingt-et-unième siècle, conserve une grande actualité. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: Ralph Waldo Emerson, Antiquité proche-orientale, écriture, hiéroglyphes,
herméneutique, pragmatique
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